A month and a half ago, we discussed how the Goldilocks narrative, which appears to have been the dominant investment paradigm recently, could be threatened by mounting evidence of domestically generated inflationary pressure. The risk to Goldilocks remains, but the nature of the threat has changed.
Recall that we define Goldilocks as an unusual set of economic circumstances that are neither too hot nor too cold, but just right for risk assets:
These conditions help deliver low risk premiums and a low risk-free rate. They combine to produce a low discount rate on the flow of risky returns that investors hope to receive in the future – or in short, higher valuations for risk assets.
We continue to believe that those valuations could come under pressure if inflation becomes ‘too hot’ for Goldilocks.
Higher inflation would prompt a shift in monetary strategy, forcing a correction in the risk-free discount rate that would weigh on valuations unless that inflationary pressure is generated by greater pricing power in the corporate sector and wider margins that boost earnings.
However, we have always been more concerned about what happens if we exit Goldilocks because the economy becomes too cold rather than too hot.
If expectations cool about the growth outlook and investors become concerned that there is a reasonable possibility of a recession within their investment horizon, we should expect to see a broad-based correction in risk premiums across asset classes, given a higher probability that the flow of returns on those assets will be impaired and the issuer may even default.
In a normal business cycle, that potentially sharp correction in risk premiums would be compensated for at least somewhat by a shift in the monetary stance that would engineer a lower risk-free yield curve. Lower risk-free rates and significantly higher risk premiums would deliver a somewhat higher discount rate.
However, with many central banks close to the lower bound on official interest rates and in some cases close to the upper bound on asset purchases too, there is relatively little scope for many of them to provide additional support to the economy in a downturn.
It is therefore of no great surprise that in the last major panic to roil financial markets – in early 2016 – concerns around the lack of monetary policy ammunition acted as an accelerant, helping to drive valuations sharply lower.
Recent data has been increasingly challenging the key foundation of Goldilocks: the synchronised global upswing. In our earlier piece, we were still comfortable reporting that “growth still looks reasonably good”, but the data has continued to slip since then.
Focus for a second on the eurozone, where the improvement in the survey data such as the purchasing managers index (or PMI) had been most apparent in late 2017. Since the turn of the year, the PMI has been quietly deflating – from 58.8 in January to a flash estimate of 54.1 in May. Other key indicators such as the Ifo business climate index tell a similar story.
The hard data on activity produced by the national statisticians is more difficult to read because it is more likely to be heavily distorted by erratic factors such as bad weather. Nonetheless, there is still the impression that the underlying pace of growth has moderated somewhat.
The data surprise indicators suggest that investors had not been expecting this turn of events, with a marked turnaround from the data consistently coming in above expectations at the start of the year to more or less the opposite phenomenon more recently.
Exhibit 1: Eurozone composite PMIs, flash estimates where available
Source: Haver, as of May 2018
Nor is this a uniquely European phenomenon. There has been a marked loss of momentum in the Japanese economy: it actually contracted in the first quarter. There is tentative evidence from the global trade data of a slowdown in the Asian export engine, but that is probably better described at this juncture as simply a reversion to trend rather than anything more worrisome. The one clear stand-out performer appears to be the US, where the activity indicators are still holding up.
Exhibit 2: PMIs, flash estimates where available
Note: North Asia 3 = South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore; * Ex-oil exports from Singapore. Source: Haver, as of May 2018
We don’t believe so, or at least not just yet. However, we are much closer to our line in the sand on whether the economy is becoming too cold. That weaker survey data needs to be put into the proper context.
Nevertheless, we do not expect investors to wait for confirmation in the hard data or for the soft data to fall to levels consistent with recession before they hit the panic button. And we will thus need to be a touch trigger-happy in our assessment too: Goldilocks is on notice.
The final question is how central banks would respond if the global economy does cool.
As we explained above, many of them have precious little monetary ammunition left to fire. The ECB could guide the market to price out what remains of the anticipated tightening cycle over the next few years with relative ease, but cutting rates further or ramping up sovereign bond purchases would be a much taller order.
Unfortunately, there is relatively little fiscal wriggle room too: relatively few governments have the capacity to inject a sizeable fiscal stimulus without re-awakening concerns about debt sustainability.
It is for precisely these reasons that we believe that a too-cold exit from Goldilocks could all too easily morph into a positively polar scenario for risk assets.
Investments in the aforementioned fund are subject to market fluctuation and risks inherent in investing in securities. The value of investments and the revenue they generate can increase or decrease and it is possible that investors will not recover their initial investment. Source: BNP Paribas Asset Management Holding.